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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k 
VELMA MARCHANT, ELMA WINTERTON, 
LEORA ROBINSON, WANDA PENROD, 
MONA LICHTY, MERLE ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. 
PARK CITY, a municipal corpor-
ation, and THE STATE OF UTAH 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 870320 
* * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & 
STATE OF UTAH 
'k-k'k'k'k'k'k'k 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-appellants, Velma Marchant and others 
(hereinafter collectively "Plaintiffs"), appeal from the judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, Utah, the 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding, entering judgment in favor 
of Defendants-respondents, Park City Municipal Corporation 
(hereinafter "Park City") and the State of Utah (hereinafter 
"State"), quieting title to the subject property in the State and 
dismissing with prejudice the complaint of Plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs commenced this action in December, 1982 
against Park City, seeking the subject property. When Plaintiffs 
later learned that Park City had previously conveyed the subject 
property to the State, they amended their complaint to also name 
the State as a Defendant. 
Prior to the trial, the Court granted Park City's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dismissing Plaintiffs1 claim 
to the property in question pursuant to the Doctrine of Boundary 
by Acquiescence. This Order was not appealed. On May 6 and 7, 
1987, trial was held without a jury. On May 22, 1987, the Court 
issued a Memorandum Decision directing Judgment to be entered in 
favor of Park City and the State. Judgment was entered by the 
Court on July 8, 1987. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment or in the alternative, 
grant a new trial, was denied on August 19, 1987. This Order was 
also not appealed. On September 8, 1987, Plaintiffs filed their 
Notice of Appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Park City and the State seek an Order of the Court 
affirming the judgment of the District Court. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts in the brief of Plaintiffs 
misstates certain important facts and omits other material facts 
upon which the Trial Court based its judgment, which dismissed 
all of Plaintiffs claims to ownership or use of the property in 
question. 
1. Subject Property, Title and Chain of Conveyances. 
(a) State's Chain of Title 
The subject Property (which is the property described 
in Plaintiffs1 complaint) is a parcel of real property in Summit 
County located in Park City. The chain of title through which the 
State claims ownership of the subject property is rooted in the 
patent issued by the United States Government. On April 5, 1882, 
the United States issued a patent to George Snyder (Ex. 27), the 
metes and bounds legal description of the patent undisputedly 
encompasses the subject property (Tr. 129-130) (Ex. 25). The 
patent on its face, shows that it was duly recorded in the 
records of the Summit County Recorder (Ex. 27). 
On November 14, 1883, George Snyder conveyed by 
Warranty Deed the portion of the patent real property (Ex. 28) 
which without dispute includes the subject property (Tr. 131-132) 
(Ex. 25) to the Park City Smelting Company. This deed was also 
duly recorded in the records of the Summit County Recorder (Ex. 
28). 
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On September 21, 1912, Park City Smelting Company 
conveyed title to all of its property in Summit County by 
Indenture Deed to Lewis H. Withey and Clay H. Hollister (Ex. 29). 
While this deed, unlike the previous deed, does not have a metes 
and bounds description, the deed does convey Mall the real 
property or rights of interest in real property belonging to the 
Park City Smelting Company and situated in the County of Summit, 
Utah, whether the same is particularly described in this deed or 
not11. (Ex. 29) (Tr. 134) This deed was also duly recorded in 
the office of the Summit County Recorder. (Ex.29) 
On November 5, 1926, the executors of the Last Will of 
Lewis H. Withey, deceased, a tenant in common with Clay H. 
Hollister, conveyed by Deed the property of Withey to Silver King 
Coalition Mines Company. (Ex. 30) 
On February 5, 1927, Clay H. Hollister, a tenant in 
common with Lewis H. Withey, conveyed by deed his interest 
personally, and all interest as Trustee for the Park City 
Smelting Company in all real property in Summit County formerly 
owned by Park City Smelting and owned at the time of conveyance 
by Hollister to Silver King Coalition Mines Company through a 
general grant clause. This deed was duly recorded in the records 
of the Summit County Recorder, as Entry No. 38097. (Ex. 31) 
On May 8, 1953, Silver King Coalition Mines Company 
conveyed by deed the subject property to United Park City Mines 
Company. (Ex. 32) The deed contains a locatable metes and bounds 
description which undisputedly includes the subject property. 
(Ex. 32) (Ex. 25) (Tr. 147) As all other deeds in Defendants1 
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chain of title, this deed was duly recorded in the records of the 
Summit County Recorder (Ex. 32). 
On April 2, 1969, United Park City Mines Company 
conveyed certain real property described by a metes and bounds 
description to Park City by Deed (Ex. 33). The description in 
this deed contains a locatable legal description which, without 
dispute, encompasses the subject property (Ex. 33), (Ex. 25) (Tr. 
149). This deed was also duly recorded in the records of the 
Summit County Recorder (Ex. 33). Park City provided valuable 
consideration to United Park City Mines Company for the subject 
property by exchanging real property for the subject property 
(Ex. 36) 
On June 7, 1982, Park City conveyed the subject 
property to the State (Ex. 34). This deed contained a legal 
description of metes and bounds which, without dispute, 
encompasses the subject property (Ex. 34), (Ex. 25) (Tr. 149, 
150). 
(b) Plaintiffs' Deeds. 
The Plaintiffs offered four deeds (Ex. 4, 5, 6, 7) as 
evidence of their claimed chain of title. The deeds are as 
follows: 
On March 19, 1906, Dan McPolin and Belle McPolin quit 
claimed any interest they might have in a "certain one story, 
frame, three roomed dwelling house situated on the easterly side 
of Silver Creek and about one hundred feet easterly of the Summit 
Lumber Company11 to Jesse McCarrel (Ex. 4). 
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On June 10, 1914 Summit County quit claimed any 
interest it might have in "improvements east U. C. Tracks, Park 
City, Utah to William Rolph (Ex, 5). 
On June 21, 1917, Summit County quit claimed any 
interest it might have in "that certain frame dwelling house by 
lumber yard in Park City, Summit County, Utah, assessed to 
William Rolfe in the year 1912 (Ex. 6). 
On June 13, 1962, Summit County issued a tax deed to 
Charles Rolfe for "house in lumber yard" (Ex. 7). 
None of the deeds of Plaintiffs contained any locatable 
legal description or even a street address. All of the deeds of 
Plaintiffs, except one, are quit claim deeds. Plaintiffs1 deeds 
were admitted pursuant to a stipulation they were authentic but 
subject to determination by the Court as to what, if anything, 
the deeds conveyed (Tr. 30-32) (R. 302-303) 
2. Extrinsic Evidence Regarding Deeds. 
Plaintiffs did not introduce any extrinsic evidence 
regarding the deeds dated 1906, 1914, 1917 (Ex. 4, 5, 6) except 
that said deeds were found among family and legal papers (Tr. 34, 
36). There was no evidence as to the location of the property 
the deeds were referring to, the location of the lumber yard or 
the U. C. Tracks in relationship to the subject property. 
The County Auditor, Reed Pace, who executed the 1963 
deed (Ex. 7) on behalf of Summit County and was Summit County 
Treasurer from 1954 to 1962 and Clerk/Auditor from 1954 to 1986, 
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testified that the 1963 tax deed executed by him was a deed 
solely to improvements to real property and not a deed to real 
property (Tr. 184-186), and that Charles Rolfe, the grantee, had 
purposely not paid taxes on the same improvements in order to 
obtain a deed from Summit County and strengthen his claim of 
title. (Tr. 183-184) 
Mr. Pace also testified that he had examined the 
records of Summit County back to the early 1900fs (Tr. 179), and 
that the practice of Summit County, both in the present and past, 
was to issue a quit claim deed for property which was not 
purchased at a tax sale. (Tr. 193) Mr. Pace further testified 
that he had no knowledge of the location of the house referred to 
in the 1963 deed. (Ex. 7) (Tr. 186) 
Both Mr. Pace and Deputy Summit County Assessor Steven 
Martin, who also had reviewed the records of Summit County (Tr. 
200), testified that it was a common practice for Summit County, 
both currently and in the past, to assess real property and 
improvements constructed upon the real property separately if the 
improvements and underlying property were separately owned. (Tr. 
179-180, 200-201) Mr. Pace also testified that if taxes became 
delinquent on the separately owned improvements, it was the 
practice of Summit County to treat the improvements like real 
property and sell the improvements at tax sale and issue a tax 
deed. (Tr. 189-190) If the improvements were not purchased at 
the tax sale, the County would later sell the improvements and 
issue a quit claim deed. (Tr. 193-194) 
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Mr. Pace also testified that when improvements were 
sold at the tax sale, the intent of of Summit County was to 
convey only the improvements and not the underlying real 
property. (Tr. 182) 
3. Possession and Abandonment of Subject Property by 
Plaintiffs. 
The first fixed date of possession by the Plaintiffs1 
claimed predecessors was 1925 (Tr. 30), according to testimony by 
Plaintiffs. All possession by Plaintiffs1 claimed predecessors 
ceased when the shack was abandoned in approximately 1964. (Tr. 
66-67) Plaintiffs never possessed the subject property. (Tr. 
65-66) From 1964 until this action was brought in 1982, the 
subject property was abandoned. The shack was vacant and appeared 
to be abandoned, the yard was unkempt and over-grown with weeds 
and there was no discernible property use according to all four 
witnesses, including one of the Plaintiffs, who testified to have 
observed it. (Tr. 66-67; 109-110; 217-218; Vol. 2 p. 6) 
Park City Building Official Ron Ivie, a certified 
building inspector with 23 years experience (Tr. 108-9), 
testified that when he inspected the shack on the subject 
property in 1981, it appeared abandoned and did not appear as 
though someone was attempting to re-habilitate it. (Tr. 109-110) 
4. Taxation of Subject Property. 
Until the subject property was acquired by Park City in 
1969 and became tax-exempt, it was subject to assessment for real 
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property taxes. Deputy Summit County Assessor, Steven Martin, 
testified that according to the records of the Summit County 
Assessor's Office, beginning in 1931, the subject property could 
be identified in the tax records by a locatable legal 
description. Prior to 1931, the Summit County Assessor's records 
do not contain a locatable legal description for the subject 
property. (Tr. 208) A summary of the County Assessor's records 
was admitted at trial. (Ex.43) The summary and testimony of Mr. 
Martin showed that from 1931 to 1936 taxes for a parcel of real 
property which undisputedly includes the subject property were 
assessed to the State's predecessor in interest, Silver King 
Coalition Mines Company, and that the assessment was for the real 
property and no taxes were assessed for improvements, and that 
said taxes were paid. (Tr. 203-4) (Ex. 43) (Ex. 25) 
The testimony and exhibits show that from 1937 to 1953 
under a slightly different legal description which also 
undisputedly encompassed the subject property, the real property 
taxes on the subject property were also assessed to Silver King 
Coalition Mines Company and that such real property taxes were 
paid every year. (Tr. 204-5) (Ex. 43) (Ex. 25) 
Mr. Martin's testimony was also that from 1954 to 1969, 
real property taxes on the subject property were assessed to 
State's predecessor United Park City Mines Company under a 
slightly different legal description which also encompassed the 
subject property and were also paid every year. (Ex. 43) (Tr. 
206) In 1951, Summit County assigned tax identification numbers 
to parcels of real property. The subject property was assigned 
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the number SA-400. (Tr. 206) From 1969 to the present, no taxes 
were paid on the subject property because of its ownership by 
Park City from 1969-1982 and the State from 1982 to the present 
(Tr. 206). 
Ed Osika, Vice President, Secretary-Treasurer of United 
Park City Mines Company testified that according to the records 
of United Park City Mines Company, it paid the real property 
taxes assessed to the United Park City Mines Company against the 
subject property for the year 1953-1969. (Tr. 167-169) Records 
of such tax payment were admitted as Exhibit 35. 
The only evidence of payment of any taxes by the 
Plaintiffs or any of their predecessors was the testimony of 
Plaintiff, Merle Anderson, that she or her mother paid taxes. 
When asked what years she had knowledge of payment of taxes the 
only years she had knowledge of were 1982 and two years prior to 
1982 (Tr. 69) and she had no knowledge of payment of taxes prior 
to 1966 (Tr. 70). The Plaintiffs introduced no records or 
testimony from the Summit County Assessor's office and Deputy 
Assessor, Steve Martin, testified that he had no knowledge of any 
payment of taxes by the Plaintiffs or their predecessors. (Tr. 
212). 
The quit claim deeds which Plaintiffs claim show 
payment of taxes (Ex. 5, 6) do not establish payment of any 
taxes. 
A letter from Reed Pace (Ex. 13), Summit County 
Treasurer, reveals that Plaintiffs1 predecessors paid no taxes 
from 1940-1954. 
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Plaintiffs introduced no evidence which could tie any 
of the scattered and infrequent tax payments to the subject 
property and it would be pure speculation as to any relationship 
between the subject property and Plaintiffs1 claimed tax 
payments. 
5. Destruction of Shack on Subject Property. 
No evidence was admitted that Park City had any 
involvement in the destruction of the shack on the subject 
property other than to issue a demolition permit to a third 
party. No claim for the destruction of the shack was made 
against the State of Utah. (Tr. Vol. 2 P. 14) 
The employee of Park City who is responsible for 
tearing down dangerous structures which are public nuisances 
testified that Park City did not tear down the shack on the 
subject property (Tr. 198). The Chief Building Official, who was 
called as a witness for the Plaintiffs, testified that a 
demolition permit for the shack on the subject property was 
issued to a third party (Ex. 38) (Tr. 94) and that the shack to 
be demolished was identified to him by a photograph since street 
names and addresses were uncertain in that area of Park City (TR. 
103-105) (Ex. 39, 40) and the shack was demolished to the best of 
his knowledge by Lloyd Brothers Construction, which was not 
working for Park City and was employed by a third party (Tr. 93). 
The procedure for issuance of a demolition permit does not 
require the applicant to prove ownership of the property (Tr. 
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96), but is issued upon the signature of the applicant that the 
applicant has the right to demolish the structure• The Building 
Official testified that he never ordered the destruction of the 
shack on the subject property (Tr. 103), that he is not aware of 
all properties owned by Park City (Tr. 107), and believed at that 
time that Deer Valley owned the shack on the subject property and 
could legally demolish it, (Tr, 106) 
Ross Lloyd, one of the owners of Lloyd Brothers 
Construction, testified that he was familiar with the demolition 
of the shack on the subject property (Tr. Vol. 2 Pg. 2). Mr. 
Lloyd testified that Lloyd Brothers Construction installed a 
water line through the subject property for Deer Valley and that 
Deer Valley ordered the shack on the subject property demolished. 
(Tr. Vol. 2 p.4) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
When this action was originally brought against only 
Park City, the Answer filed by Park City set forth that the owner 
of the subject property, the State, was an indispensible party 
and the action could not proceed unless the State as an 
indispensible party was properly joined. The Plaintiffs failed 
to properly join the State. 
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In order to bring this action against the State, 
Plaintiffs must comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1, et. seq., 1953, as amended. 
Pursuant to § 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated,
 n o t i c e o f 
claim against the State must be filed within one year after the 
claim arose and failure to timely and properly file notice of 
claim by the Plaintiffs bars this action. 
In Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1376-80 (Utah 1977) the 
Utah Supreme Court indicated that the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act was applicable to quiet title actions involving the State and 
that those bringing quiet title actions against the State must 
file timely notice of claim within one year of the arising of the 
cause of action. 
No claim was filed against the State at any time. 
Thus, no action could be brought against the State (which 
preserved the defense of governmental immunity in its Amended 
Answer), to recover the subject property from the State. The 
Trial Court properly ruled that the Plaintiffs were barred for 
failing to properly file a claim against the State. Thus, this 
Court should uphold the ruling of the Trial Court and dismiss 
this action since an the State, an indispensible party, was never 
properly joined and Plaintiffs claim for relief against the State 
is barred. 
See Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center 617 P.2d 532 (Utah 




BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In order to prevail in a quiet title action the moving 
party must succeed on the strength of its own title to the 
subject property and cannot rely only on weaknesses in the 
opposing party's title. This essential element of quiet title is 
cited in no fewer than six Utah Supreme Court decisions since 
1967.2 
Plaintiffs, without setting forth which of the Trial 
Court's factual findings they claim to be erroneous, have 
submitted a statement of facts which selectively sets forth only 
those facts which they believe support their case. In Bennion v. 
Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court held: 
In reviewing the evidence, we view it in the 
light most favorable to the trial court...the 
Brother's Counsel has not approached this appeal 
with these standards in mind. His brief ignores 
the Trial Court's findings and invites this Court 
to reweigh all the evidence on the issue and 
independently find the facts. That is not this 
Court's role, and we firmly decline the brother's 
invitation. (Citation omitted) 
The Plaintiffs in the instant matter are also inviting 
the Appellate Court to reweigh the evidence and independently 
find the facts. This invitation must again be firmly denied. 
See Music Service Corporation v. Walton, 432 P.2d 334, 20 
Utah 2d 16 (1967); Smith v. Detfliro, 486 ?.2d 1036, 26 Utah 153 
(1971); Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co. 511 P.2d 145, 29 
Utah 2d 421 (1973); Colman v. Butkovich, 538 P.~2d 188 (Utah 1975); 
Ash v. State, 572 P.2d TT7% (Utah T977); Church v. Meadows 
Springs Ranch, Inc., 659 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1983) 
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The proper standard of review requires the Appellate 
Court to not disturb the findings of the Trial Court if there is 
substantial evidence in the record to support them. Bennion at 
759. Also the evidence must be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the judgment of the Trial Court. (City Electric v. 
Industrial Indem Co., 683 P.2d 1053, 1059-60 (Utah 1984), Ash v. 
State, 572P.2d 1374 (1977)). Moreover if there is a conflict in 
the evidence, the Appellate Court must "defer to the Trial 
Court's first-hand assessment of the witnesses1 credibility and 
assume that the Trial Court believed those aspects of the 
evidence which support its findings11. ( Hal Taylor Associates, v. 
Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982)). 
As is shown in the extensive statement of facts in this 
brief, in the record itself and the facts found by the Trial 
Court in its memorandum decision (Rec. 368-373) and Findings of 
Fact (Rec. 378-385) entered with the judgment are supported by 
substantial facts and should be upheld by this Court. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE ADVERSE POSSESSION 
The Plaintiffs claim the subject property by Adverse 
Possession under Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-10 et. seq. In 
order to obtain the subject real property by Adverse Possession, 
the Plaintiffs must prove that they have complied precisely with 
all of the requirements for adverse possession found in Utah Code 
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Annotated § 78-12-10, et. seq. , 1954 as amended. The Court in 
Home Owners1 Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (Utah 
1943) held that the party claiming adverse possession ,fhas the 
burden of pleading and proving full compliance with the statute." 
This holding was reaffirmed in Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P. 2d 979 
(Utah 1979), and most recently in United Park City Mines Co, v. 
Estate of Clegg, 737 P. 2d 173 (Utah, 1987) where the Court 
held:lf0ne who seeks to acquire title to real property other than 
by conveyance must comply precisely with the statutory 
requirements for doing so." (Emphasis added.) 
The statutory elements of Adverse Possession are: 
1. Possess land in the statutorily prescribed manner, 
for the statutory period of seven years; 
2. Hold the land adversely to title holder; 
3. Pay all taxes legally assessed against the land 
for the seven year period. 
i 
It is only required that Plaintiffs1 fail to comply precisely 
with the statutory requirements of a single element to have their 
claim of adverse possession fail completely. 
A. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SHOW PAYMENT OF ALL TAXES LEGALLY 
ASSESSED AGAINST THE LAND FOR ANY SEVEN YEAR PERIOD. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-12, 1953 as amended, 
requires that Mthe party, his predecessors and grantors have paid 
all taxes which have been levied and assessed upon such land
 i 
according to law.11 (emphasis added) 
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The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
requirement of payment of all taxes is a mandatory requirement, 
which if not proven by the party claiming adverse possession, 
will defeat his claim. The Court explained this requirement in 
its ruling in Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 141 P. 2d 
160, 166 (Utah 1943), stating: "An adverse claimant has the duty 
of pleading and proving full compliance with the statute, 
3 
including payment of all taxes lawfully assessed....11 
Prior to 1931, no evidence of payment of taxes was 
available. Deputy Summit County Assessor Steven Martin was 
unable to locate records of payment of taxes on the subject 
property. The two quit claim deeds issued by Summit County (Ex. 
5, 6), which Plaintiffs cite as proof of tax payment, only recite 
that consideration paid was $28.68 and $1.00, respectively. 
There was no evidence that such consideration had any 
relationship whatsoever to any taxes assessed. There was no 
evidence as to what years of taxes the consideration represented. 
The deeds are entitled Quit Claim deeds, probably issued after a 
tax sale found no buyers. Plaintiffs' claim that issuance of 
such deeds "unequivocally" proves payment of all taxes for the 
pre-1931 period is incredible and contrary to settled Utah law. 
In Bowen v. Olsen 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P2d 983 (1954), the Court 
ruled that redeeming property at a tax sale or purchasing 
property at a tax sale does not constitute the payment of taxes 
See also Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979) 
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necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for adverse 
possession. Thus any redemption or purchase from Summit County 
by Plaintiffs' predecessors could not satisfy the requirement 
that taxes be paid for seven years by the party claiming adverse 
4 possession. 
From 1931 to 1969, the State's predecessors and not the 
Plaintiffs' predecessors paid all real property taxes on the 
subject property from 1931 to 1969. A letter from then County 
Treasurer Reed Pace, dated May 16, 1957, (Ex. 13) reveals that 
Plaintiff's predecessor did not pay any taxes whatsoever for the 
period of 1940-1955 and Plaintiffs themselves admitted to no 
knowledge of payment of any taxes prior to 1966 and only claimed 
payment in 1982 and two other years before 1982 and after 1966. 
Thus, at trial Plaintiffs failed to show payment of all 
taxes assessed for any seven year period, failing to meet the 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-12, 1953, as amended. 
In Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P2d 979, 982 (Utah 1979), the Supreme 
Court held: 
This Court has held an adverse claimant has the 
burden of proving full statutory compliance, 
including the payment of all taxes assessed. 
Kelsch testified that he did not know whether or 
not he had paid taxes on the disputed property, 
and he did not present any evidence of the payment 
of taxes. Since Kelsch did not carry his burden 
of proof, the Trial Court erred in holding adverse 
possession as an alternative basis for Quieting 
Title in Kelsch. 
.See also Aggelos v. Zella Mining Co. , 107 P.2d 170 (Utah 
1940), where the Supreme Court also held that redemption at a tax 
(Footnote Continued) 
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Parkwest Village v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986), 
which is relied upon by Plaintiffs, is distinguishable from the 
instant matter and totally inapplicable. In Avise, the Court 
ruled that if the land holder did not pay any taxes, the 
improvement owner's payment of taxes for seven years is 
sufficient for adverse possession purposes. There is no holding 
or suggestion in Avise that the Adverse Possessor is relieved 
from his duty to prove payment of all taxes for seven consecutive 
years. 
Clearly the failure by the Plaintiffs to prove payment 
of all taxes for any seven year period precludes them from 
obtaining the subject property by adverse possession. 
Even if Plaintiff could show payment of taxes for the 
required seven year period, the enunciated purpose behind the 
requirement of payment of all taxes by the party claiming adverse 
possession is to put the true owner on notice that his land is 
being adversely claimed. This purpose is stated in Bowen v. 
Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P.2d 983 (1954). In the instant matter, 
there is no identifiable location of the improvements on which 
Plaintiffs claimed to have paid taxes. The absence of any 
description sufficient to locate the improvements assessed is 
insufficient to put the State or its predecessors on notice of 
any adverse claim as required by Bowen. 
(Footnote Continued) 
sale did not constitute payment of taxes required under adverse 
possession. 
-19-
B. PLAINTIFFS DID NOT POSSESS THE SUBJECT PROPERTY 
AFTER 1964 
The requirements for establishment of "possession" depend on 
whether the adverse claimant is claiming under color of title or 
not. Color of title is not necessary, but it makes the element 
of possession easier to meet for the adverse claimant. Claiming 
under color of title also affects the amount of land which can be 
secured by possessory activities. 
Plaintiffs, through their complaint, have not claimed 
Adverse Possession under color of title, but only claimed under 
the non-color of title section. (See Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint (Rec. 13) 
Plaintiffs, as adverse claimants without color of 
title, may establish possession only through the possessory 
activities found in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-11 (this Section 
has been in effect and remains substantially unchanged since 
1872); The adverse claimant without color of title can thus only 
acquire the land actually inclosed, cultivated, improved, or 
irrigated. The statutory language allows claiming "the land so 
actually occupied and no other, is deemed to have been held 
adversely." Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-10, 1953 as amended. 
The adverse claimant without color of title does not have the 
benefit of the statutory section applicable to those who claim 
with color of title which reads: 
Where a known farm of single lot has been partly 
improved, the portion of such farm or lot that 
may have been left not cleared or not inclosed 
according to the usual course and custom of the 
adjoining county is deemed to have been occupied 
for the same length of time as the part improved 
and cultivated. Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-9(4), 
1953 as amended. 
Since 1964, Plaintiffs have failed to reach the minimum 
threshold of possession under either color or non-color of title. 
The testimony at trial, upon which the Court ruled the property 
was abandoned, was that Plaintiffs neither lived in or rented the 
property and only occasionally visited the property allowing it 
to deteriorate and become overgrown with brush and weeds. There 
were no fences or defined yard and no sign of any cultivation or 
improvements. Additionally, the activities of Plaintiffs failed 
to, "give actual or constructive notice to the legal title 
holder...[sufficient] to give a reasonably prudent title holder 
notice of the claimant's intention.ff Olwell v. Clark, 658 P. 2d 
585, 587 (Utah 1982). In order for conduct alone to give such 
notice, "it must be conduct that is inconsistent with the rights 
of the owner.11 Olwell at 587. In Pender v. Jackson, 123 Utah 
501, 260 P. 2d 542, (1953) the Utah Supreme Court ruled that 
holding land for speculation was not a use sufficient to meet the 
requirements of adverse possession. The Court stated: 
Merely holding land for speculation is the purpose 
for which the land is held and not use of the land; 
we are not disposed to distort the phrase "ordinary 
use of the occupant" to a point beyond meaning. 
This is true even though a landowner is cognizant 
of the facts and the adverse claim became the 
necessary element of occupation, as defined by 
the Utah Statute, is not established. 
See also Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980 (Utah 1982) 
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The Court in Pender cited with approval its earlier 
decision in Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 P.2d 216 (1947) 
where surveying of the property erecting tie posts in corners, 
clearing greasewood from the property, placing a sign on the 
property, allowing a carnival to use a small portion of the 
property for a week, and placing fill dirt on the property were 
all cumulatively held to be insufficient to possess the property 
under the lesser standard of the color of title statute. 
The possessory activities must continuously be of the 
character necessary under § 78-12-9 or § 78-12-11. The adverse 
claimant need not occupy the land constantly in order to occupy 
it "continuously11, but the adverse claimant's possession may not 
be sporadic. In determining what is "continuous" and what is 
"sporadic" the character of the land and the type of use to which 
it is being put are important. In the instant matter with the 
residential nature of the property at issue, the complete failure 
to occupy the property since 1964 destroys Plaintiffs1 ability to 
claim ripening of adverse possession during this period. 
C. PLAINTIFFS' USE OF THE REAL PROPERTY WAS PERMISSIVE 
NOT ADVERSE 
In Utah, "[t]o acquire title by adverse 
possession...the possession [must be] with an intention on the 
part of the claimant to claim title as owner and against the 
See also Powell on Real Property, § 1018, pg 739 
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rights of the true owner.1 Since intent is generally unstated, 
it must be inferred from the possessory acts. The intent to 
claim title will be inferred fl[w]henever the possession is of 
Q 
such a character that ownership may be inferred.11 
In the instant matter, the testimony trial was that it 
was a common practice of mining companies in Park City to permit 
the use of their property. The Defendants predecessors in 
interest, Silver King Coalition Mines (1927-1953) and United Park 
City Mine Company (1953-1969), both permitted the use of their 
property, including the subject property, by employees and others 
to erect homes and live there (Tr. 174), the 1906 deed (Ex. 4) by 
which Plaintiffs claim title, recognizes the permissive use of 
the underlying real property by referring to "privileges" in the 
land. Plaintiffs introduced no evidence that the use of the 
subject property by their predecessor was adverse rather than 
permissive. 
Once it is established the use was initially permissive 
the inference and burden of proof of the adverse nature of the 
use shifts back to the adverse claimant to show that the use 
somehow became adverse. In Richens v. Struhs, 412, P.2d 314 17 
Utah 2d 356 (1966) the shifting of the burden is enunciated. The 
Court reasoned that unless the person claiming adverse possession 
Montgomery Adverse Possession of Land Titles in Utah 3 Utah 
Law Review 294, at 309 (quoting Dignan v. Nelson, 72 P. 936, 937 
(Utah 1903)) 
Q 
Montgomery at 309 (quoting Pioneer Investment & Trust Co. 
v. Board of Education, 99 P. 150, 152 (Utah 1909)) 
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could show that the use became adverse he would be allowed to 
lfsneak up on the owner by using his property under permission and 
then after a lapse of time claim he was using it as a matter of 
right" (at 316). Plaintiffs1 claim of adverse possession falls 
precisely into the category of behavior proscribed by Richins. 
POINT IV 
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS PLAINTIFFS 
In order to bring an action for recovery of real 
property the person bringing the actions must be seized or 
possessed of the property within seven years of the commencement 
of the action. This statute of limitation is found at § 78-12-5 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which states: 
No action for the recovery of real property or for the 
possession thereof shall be maintained, unless it 
appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or 
predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in 
question within seven years before the commencement of 
the action. 
The Trial Court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs were 
barred by this statute of limitations since at the trial they 
failed to show possession within seven years of commencement of 
the action. 
POINT V 
THE SPECIAL TAX TITLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS INAPPLICABLE 
Plaintiffs, who never claimed a tax title in their 
Amended Complaint (Rec. 12-15), now contend on appeal that the 
deeds issued in 1914, 1917 and 1963 by Summit County (Ex. 5, 6, 
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7), are entitled to the special protections for tax titles found 
in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-5.1, § 78-12-5.2 and § 78-12-5.3 
1953 as amended. This argument is totally without merit. 
The Plaintiff's predecessors in 1914, 1917 and 1963 
were attempting to misuse the property taxation and enforcement 
system to boot strap themselves into a title by failing to pay 
taxes. The Plaintiffs claim that their predecessors became the 
owner of the subject property pursuant to the 1906 deed (Ex. 4). 
The 1917 deed on its face states that the taxes had been 
previously assessed in 1912 to William Rolfe, the Grantee, (Ex. 
6) who obviously owed taxes prior to 1914 and failed to pay them. 
The testimony of retired County Treasurer Reed Pace, who executed 
the 1963 deed, (Ex. 7) was that Charles Rolfe, the Grantee, was 
the person who owed the taxes on the "house in lumberyard11 for 
which the 1963 tax deed was conveyed and purposely failed and 
refused to pay the taxes in order to obtain a tax deed to the 
house in the lumber yard. 
The Plaintiffs are urging this Court to rule that those 
who fail to pay their taxes should be rewarded with the special 
statutory protection of third parties who purchase at tax sale. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has already rejected this spurious 
argument. In Dillman v. Foster, 656 P2d 974 (Utah 1982), the 
Court held that: "One who is under an obligation to pay taxes on 
land cannot be allowed to strengthen his title to such land by 
buying in the tax title when the property is sold as a 
consequence of his omission to pay taxes11, (at 979). 
-25-
The Court in Dillman refused to apply the special 
statutes of limitations found in § 78-12-5-1, § 78-12-5.2 and 
9 
§78-12-5.3., and also held that those who were legally obligated 
to pay taxes obtained nothing at the tax sale except release of 
the lien imposed by the County for failure to pay their taxes. 
The rule in Dillman prevents exactly the type of 
activity engaged in by Plaintiffs1 claimed predecessors that of 
attempting to clothe themselves with a title by willfully failing 
to pay property taxes. 
Secondly, in 1983, the United States Supreme Court in 
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791 (1983) ruled 
that a tax foreclosure and sale was void for denial of due 
process of law if all lienholders did not receive actual prior 
notice of the foreclosure proceeding. In applying this holding 
to a situation identical to the instant action, the Third Circuit 
held in Benoit v. Pathaky, 780 F.2d 336 (3rd Cir. 1985), that 
failure to give consitutionally sufficient notice was a 
jurisdictional defect which rendered inapplicable the special tax 
title statute of limitations. 
In the instant matter, what notice or what tax 
foreclosure proceedings, if any was given at the turn of the 
century, is unknown. However, it is clear that State's 
predecessor and grantor, United Park City Mines Company, had no 
The Utah Supreme Court also refused to apply the special 
statute of limitations for tax titles in a situation where one 
tenant in common ahd obtained a tax deed in Massey v. Prothero, 
664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1982) 
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notice of any tax sale in 1963 which would affect its title since 
it paid property taxes on the underlying real property both 
before and after the issuance of the 1963 tax deed. 
Even if, arguendo, the deeds which Plaintiffs claim are 
shielded by virtue of the special statute of limitations for tax 
titles, the unassailable title is to improvements only since that 
is all the deeds convey by their descriptions. According to 
Harman v. Polter, 592 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979), the description in a 
deed is prima facie evidence of the intent of the grantor. There 
is no evidence which would rebut the prima facie evidence that 
Summit County only intended to convey improvements by the deeds 
issued by them. 
POINT VII 
MARKETABLE TITLE ACT VESTS PROPERTY IN 
PLAINTIFFS NOT DEFENDANTS 
The Plaintiffs in Point III of their brief wrongly 
claim that the marketable title act operates to vest title in 
them. Plaintiffs are ignoring the requirement in the Act, found 
in §57-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, that the 
recorded conveyances relied upon must either create an interest 
in, "(1) the person claiming such interest, or (2) some other 
person from whom, by one or more conveyances or other title 
transactions of record, such purported interest has become vested 
in the person claiming such interest..."(emphasis added). 
The Act clearly and unequivocally requires that the 
root of the unbroken chain of title in excess of forty years 
contain a chain of recorded conveyances to the person claiming 
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protection under the Marketable Title Act. The root deed 
Plaintiffs claim is a conveyance to a William Rolfe. There are 
no subsequent conveyances from William Rolfe to anyone else, 
including the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs clearly cannot meet the 
requirement of §57-9-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and 
thus cannot claim the benefits and protections of the Marketable 
Title Act. 
On the other hand, State's chain of title does meet the 
requirements for protection under the Marketable Title Act. The 
chain of title through which Defendant State of Utah claims title 
is an unbroken chain extending back to the Patent issued in 1882. 
The conveyance from Clay H. Hollister to Silver King Coalition 
Mines Company in 1927 would satisfy the requirements of the Act 
and serve to vest title free and clear of the prior conveyances 
claimed by Plaintiffs, pursuant to §57-9-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended. 
POINT VIII 
THE DOCTRINE OF PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT 
IS INAPPLICABLE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ADVERSE 
POSSESSION 
Plaintiffs have sought a prescriptive easement covering the 
entire subject property. This claim is extremely novel. 
Plaintiffs would have this Court rule that if a person seeking 
adverse possession fails to establish all of the elements for 
See Swenson, The Utah Marketable Title Act, 8 Utah L. Rev. 
205-206, 1963 
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adverse possession, he may obtain all of the attributes of 
ownership by prescriptive easement. In other words, Plaintiffs 
are attempting to gain title to the subject property 
prescriptively without proving all of the elements necessary to 
gain title by adverse possession. An easement of the scope 
claimed by Plaintiffs is actually not an easement at all; it is a 
fee simple interest 
An easement, as distinguished from ownership, is a mere 
right to use the land of another for a limited purpose. The Utah 
Supreme Court has described the interlocking interests of owner 
and easement holder created by the existence of an easement in 
the following terms: 
Whenever there is ownership of property subject 
to an easement there is a dichotomy of interests, 
both of which must be represented and kept in 
balance. On the one hand, it is to be realized that 
the owner of the fee title, because of his general 
ownership, should have the use and enjoyment of his 
property to the highest degree possible, not 
inconsistent with the easement. On the other, the 
owner of the easement should likewise have the right to 
use and enjoy his easement to the fullest extent 
possible not inconsistent with the rights of the fee 
owner. 
North Union Canal Company v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 179 (Utah 
1976) (citations omitted). This formulation of balanced rights 
assumes that the owner of the servient tenement retains some 
rights in the land. The extent of the "easement" claimed by 
Plaintiffs leaves no rights to the fee owner, the State. 
x
 See also United States v. 0'Block, 788 F2d 1433 (10th Cir. 
1986) 
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The concept of "easement" clearly addresses use, as 
distinguished from occupation and enjoyment of land. While the 
Utah Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to rule on the 
nature of this distinction, the distinction has been recognized 
by Courts throughout the nation, for example, the Illinois 
Supreme Court observed: 
There are... rights to be exercised in connection with 
corporal things but without any ownership, possession, 
control or power of disposition of the thing in 
connection with which the power may be exercised and 
without any profit therein, such as a right to pass 
over another's land;...These are easements which 
consist in the right of the owner of one parcel of 
land, by reason of such ownership, to use the land of 
another for a special purpose not inconsistent with the 
general property in the owner, and there are always 
distinct from the occupation and enjoyment of the land 
itself, [citations omitted]. A distinguishing feature 
of an easement is the absence of all right to 
participate in the profits of the soil charged with it. 
[citations omitted.] 
Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 131 N.E. 645, 648 (111. 
1921). 
Our neighboring jurisdiction of Colorado described the 
limits of the extent of easement rights as follows: lf[W]hile 
plaintiff had obtained an easement by prescription, it had not 
acquired title to the land over which it flows. The easement, 
therefor, should not work a dispossession of the landowner." 
Osborn & Claywood Ditch Co. v. Green, 673 P.2d 380, 382 (Colo. 
1983) (emphasis added).12 
12 
The West Virginia and Missouri Courts are also in accord. 
See Ballanges v. Beckley Coal & Supply Co., 161 S. E. 562, 563 
(W. Viu 19J1) ; and St. Louis County v. St. Appalonia Corp. , 471 
S. W. 2d 238, 246 (Mo. 1971) 
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Plaintiffs1 claimed "easement" over the subject 
property is essentially inconsistent with both the "general 
ownership," (North Union Canal at 179), of the fee owner and the 
"use and enjoyment," (Id at 179), pursuant thereto that the Utah 
Supreme Court contemplates in its concept of an "easement". (Id 
1 O 
at 179). Plaintiffs claim the right to the exclusive use and 
enjoyment of the entire surface. Plaintiffs claim the right to 
alienate, devise and assign that right of exclusive use. 
Plaintiffs1 claim the right to profit from the land by leasing 
that right of exclusive use to others. Plaintiffs1 claim the 
right to maintain a dwelling on the land and to use the land as 
they see fit without regard to the fee owner's interests. The 
sum of the rights claimed by Plaintiffs leaves nothing to the 
State that can qualify as a "general ownership". 
In short, Plaintiffs1 are seeking ownership of the 
property in dispute through a misapplication of the Prescriptive 
Easement Doctrine. The result urged by Plaintiffs has never been 
reached by any Court in Utah or the nation. The granting of such 
a prescriptive easement would also subvert adverse possession and 
violate the public policy behind the requirement of payment of 
taxes so as to put the record owner on notice. See Bowen v. 
Olsen, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P.2d 983 (1954). 
±JSee also Wycoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1982); 
McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978); Flying Diamond 
v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976) 
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The cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of their claim 
of prescriptive easement are all factually distinguishable and 
inapplicable to the instant matter. Plaintiffs have not cited 
a single case which holds for their proposition that an adverse 
possessor can gain all of the attributes of ownership through the 
doctrine of prescriptive easement if he fails to meet the 
requirements for adverse possession. 
POINT IX 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT PROPERLY RAISE STATUTES OF 
LIMITATIONS, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES 
The Utah Supreme Court has declared and held that ffit 
is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties 
in the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.'1 
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) 
While the special statute of limitations is 
inapplicable for the reason found in Point V of this brief, it is 
also important to note that such statute of limitations was never 
properly raised. The general rule is that statute of limitations 
must be pleaded pursuant to Rule 8 U.R.C.P. or it is waived. See 
Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948 is a ruling on 
use of-a right-of-way across another1s property. Richins v. 
Struhs, 412 P.2d 314, 17 U.2d 35 (1966§0 is a ruling that the 
owner of a driveway could not prevent the use of the driveway by 
the neighboring owner who had gained prescriptive rights. The 
final case cited by Plaintiffs, Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 
175 P. 2d 714 (1946) also involved use only of a right-of-way 
across another's property. 
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Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co,, 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 
1983). The Court has adopted a more liberal standard in Quiet 
Title actions which requires, in lieu of pleading the statute of 
limitations in situations where no responsive pleading is allowed 
to the party asserting statute of limitations, to "do all he 
[can] to assert the statute,,f Hansen v, Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310,31, 
283 P.2d 884, 887 (1955). 
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs did not claim a tax 
title in their pleading (Rec. 12-15), and did absolutely nothing 
to assert the statute before raising it at the time of trial and 
thus should be barred from relying upon it. 
In Point V of their brief, Plaintiffs declare that the 
State's claim to the subject property is barred by Laches and 
Estoppel. This is the first time Plaintiffs raised Laches and 
Estoppel in this matter. According to Rules 8 and 12 U.R.C.P., 
both Laches and Estoppel are defenses of an affirmative nature 
which must be raised no later than the responsive pleading. 
Failure to timely raise Laches and Estoppel until the appeal 
results in such defenses being forever waived pursuant to Rule 
12(h) U.R.C.P. 
In Manger v. Davis, 619 P2d 687, 692 (Utah 1980), a 
party failed to plead estoppel as required by Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P. 
and the Court ruled that the defense of estoppel was waived 
pursuant to Rule 12(h) U.R.C.P. The result in Manger is not 
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unique. The Utah Supreme Court has routinely held that the claim 
of estoppel could not be considered the first time on appeal.15 
While the Utah Court has not had the opportunity to 
rule on the precise issue of waiver of laches, it is governed by 
the same rules as estoppel and also cannot be raised initially on 
appeal. 
Thus it is beyond dispute that Plaintiffs1 failure to 
timely raise estoppel and laches in response to Defendant's claim 
of ownership of the subject property constitutes waiver of 
estoppel and laches and Plaintiffs cannot raise such defenses for 
the first time on appeal. 
Even if, arguendo, Plaintiffs had properly raised 
laches and estoppel, such doctrines favor Defendants and not 
Plaintiffs. When Park City obtained the subject property by 
exchanging property with United Park City Mines Company in 1969, 
the Plaintiffs had already abandoned the subject property. When 
Plaintiffs brought this action in 1982, they asserted ownership 
by ancient deeds which had no identifiable description and could 
not put anyone on notice of any claim to the subject property. 
Until Plaintiffs asserted their claim to the subject 
property in 1982, Park City and the State had no notice of any 
claim and had an unbroken chain of title extending back to 
Patent. It is the Plaintiffs and not the Defendants who should 
be barred by estoppel and laches for delaying 72 years in 
^See Davis v. Barrett, 24 Utah 2d 162, 467 P.2d 603 (1970), 
Tanner v. Provo Reservoir~Co., 2 P.2d 107 (1931) 
-34- i 
bringing this action. Defendant State of Utah was the record 
holder of the property and thus had no reason to bring any 
action. The delay of Plaintiffs disadvantaged the State. It is 
extremely difficult to defend against an adverse possession claim 
when the adverse possession allegedly occurred seventy years ago. 
POINT X 
PLAINTIFFS DEEDS ARE NULL AND VOID 
At the trial, Plaintiffs submitted four deeds through 
which they claimed title to the subject property. A common 
element of all of the Plaintiffs deeds is the complete absence of 
any locatable description of the property which the deed was 
purporting to convey. The Trial Court specifically found that 
the Plaintiff's deeds were void for lack of a description by 
which the property to be conveyed could be located or even 
identified. (Rec. 368). 
The Trial Court obviously relied on well-settled Utah 
law that "a deed must contain a sufficiently definite description 
to identify the property it conveys11, Colman v. Butkovich, 556 
P2d 503, 505 (Utah 1976). If, after applying the rules of 
construction which are generally applicable to controversies over 
the meaning of documents to the deed in question, the Court is 
still unable to identify the property the deed is attempting to 
convey, then the deed is null and void. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has upheld descriptions in 
option agreements which identified the property by street address 
in Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714 P2d 1137 (Utah 1986); 
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and Reed v, Alvey, 610 P2d 1374 (Utah 1980), the descriptions in 
the Plaintiffs1 deeds do not contain even a street address to 
identify the property. The opportunity to resort to reasonable 
inferences and extrinsic evidence at the trial as prescribed in 
Colman, did not yield any clue as to the relationship, if any, 
between the property referred to in the deeds and the subject 
property. 
The absence in Plaintiffs1 deeds of any descriptions to 
locate or identify the property to be conveyed makes the instant 
matter easily distinguishable from Colman where the commonly used 
abbreviations in the legal description was not fatal because 
there was "a sound basis for the trial courts conclusion that the 
description in the deed was sufficiently definite to convey the 
property in question11 (Colman at 505). 
The testimony regarding the deeds which was given at 
the trial was that the Plaintiffs found the deeds among papers at 
their mothers1 or fathers1 homes or among their families1 legal 
documents. (Tr. 34, 36) No testimony was given which would 
relate, in any way, the subject property to the deeds offered by 
Plaintiffs. In Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P2d 1113 (Utah 1985), the 
Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that it allowed parol evidence to 
fix the location of an ambiguous or uncertain description in an 
option agreement in Reed v. Alvey, but held that where no 
additional evidence is available such indefinite documents are 
void. 
It is also important to note the higher standard to 
which deeds are held to by the Utah law in contrast with other 
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documents such as options. In Howard v. Howard, 12 Utah 2d 407, 
367 P.2d 193, (1962), the Utah Supreme Court held that a warranty 
deed was a nullity simply because the description found in the 
deed failed to close on the fifth and sixth courses. The deeds 
on which the Plaintiffs1 rely in the instant matter, do not even 
contain an identifiable description of real property. The Court 
in Howard held: 
Either it is impossible to determine what Howard had in 
mind or, conjecture indulged one would have to divine 
that any number of areas could be said to have been 
intended. In such case, abstractors and lawyers should 
be able to turn down a title based on the contentions 
of such an illusary intention of a deceased (at 195). 
It is clearly beyond dispute that if a deed with a 
defective legal description in which Grantors1 intent is not 
reasonably determinable is fatally deficient, then the 
Plaintiffs1 deeds with no locatable or identifiable legal 
descriptions and and no clue as to the Grantors1 intent, are even 
more deficient. 
The only party to the 1963 Deed (Ex. 7) who testified 
is former Summit County Auditor Reed Pace. Mr. Pace's testimony 
was that the deed he executed (Ex. 7) conveyed title to the 
improvements described only and not to any underlying real 
property the improvements may be situated on. Mr. Pace further 
testified that he had no knowledge of the location of the 
improvements referred to in the deed he executed. 
The Plaintiffs in the instant matter are asking this 
Court to reverse the trial court and ignore the well-founded 
requirement in Utah that deeds identify the property they are to 
convey, and to rule that the vague and unlocatable descriptions 
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in the deeds upon which the Plaintiffs rely are sufficient to 
quiet title in the Plaintiffs to the real property described in 
their complaint. This is clearly contrary to settled Utah law. 
The rule in Utah, which requires a deed to contain a 
description sufficient to identify the property, is well founded 
and followed throughout the United States. 
Tax Deeds are routinely held to even higher standards 
than inter-party deeds. The New Mexico Supreme Court in 
Brylinski v. Cooper, 624 P. 2d 522 (New Mexico 1981) held that a 
stricter test for the description of a tax deed is applied. The 
reason for the stricter test is that tax deeds must give notice 
to the foreclosed owner and the public of what particular 
property is being conveyed. 
POINT XI 
THE TITLE OF THE STATE IS THE SUPERIOR TITLE 
If, arguendo, the Plaintiffs deeds were deemed to be 
valid, the chain of title through which the Defendant State of 
Utah claims the subject real property is still clearly the 
See Boone v. Pritchett, 130 Se.2d 288 (North Carolina 
1963); MacKuEbTn v. Rosedale Memorial Park, Inc., 198 A.2d 856 
(Pennsylvania 1964); See also 4 Tiffany, Real Property, 3rd Ed. 
Sec. 990 
17See also Wingard v. Heinkel, 424 P.2d 1010 (Wash. 1967) 
and Yetter v. Gallitln County, 645 P.2d 941 (Mont. 1982) 
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superior chain of title. Plaintiffs claim of a chain of title is 
indeed curious. The Plaintiffs1 deeds are a quit claim deed from 
McPolin to McCarrel (Ex. 4), a quit claim deed from Summit County 
to a William Rolph (Ex. 5), a quit claim deed from Summit County 
to a William Rolfe (Ex. 6), and a tax deed from Summit County to 
Charles Rolfe (Ex. 7). There are no deeds from any of the 
Grantees to any other Grantee, and none from any Grantee to any 
of the Plaintiffs. There are simply four disconnected deeds upon 
which the Trial Court ruled that the chain of title of Plaintiffs 
was discontinuous. (Rec. 368) 
In contrast, the paper chain of title of the State is an 
unbroken chain back to the original source, the Patent issued by 
Chester A. Arthur as President of the United States. This is a 
complete and perfect chain of title as defined by the Utah 
Supreme Court and no proof of actual possession is needed. In 
Music Service Corporation v. Walton, 432 P.2d 334, 20 Utah 2d 16 
(1967) the Utah Supreme Court cited with approval Cottrell v. 
Pickering, 32 Utah 62, 88 P. 696 (1907) and held that: "Of 
course, where one proves a perfect chain of paper title from its 
original source, no proof of actual possession is required. In 
such event the presumption would be all sufficient and the title 
would be a complete and perfect title11 (at 336). 
The only expert title abstractor who testified at 
Trial, Nick Butkovich, testified that State's chain of title was 
superior to Plaintiffs1. 
-39-
Plaintiffs have attacked the State's chain of title 
because two of the seven links in the chain (Ex. 28, 29, 30), 1 8 
contain general grant or "Mother Hubbard" descriptions rather 
than a metes and bounds description of the subject property, 
"'Mother Hubbard1 descriptions purporting to convey all of the 
Grantor's land or all land situate in a certain area have been 
19 
repeatedly upheld." A recent case example of a "Mother 
Hubbard" description being upheld is Luthi v. Evans, 576 P. 2d 
1064 (Kan. 1978). Such descriptions are not void for uncertainty 
because the property referred to by the "Mother Hubbard" 
description can be determined from previous of-record conveyances 
to the Grantor. 
Finally, Plaintiffs claim of a chain of title is 
further barred by an attempt to claim tax deed(s) as part of 
their chain of title. It is settled Utah law that a tax deed 
either adds nothing to title if the tax deed is obtained by the 
party who actually owed the taxes, or creates a new title if the 
tax deed is obtained by a third party who had no duty to pay 
taxes. 
This rule of law is set forth in Dillman v. Foster, 656 
P. 2d 974 (Utah 1982) and Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300 
(Utah 1982). 
Two of the deeds (Ex. 29 and 30) are deeds from each of 
two tenants in common and therefore represent only a single link 
in the chain. 
19Thompson on Real Property, 1962 Repl. Vol. 6 3023 pg. 453 
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POINT XII 
SEPARATE TAXATION & FORFEITURE OF REAL PROPERTY 
AND IMPROVEMENTS IS ULTRA VIRES AND DEEDS SO ISSUED 
ARE VOID 
The practice of Summit County to separately assess and tax 
improvements from the real property upon which the improvements 
were constructed if there is separate ownership, was recognized 
by this Court in Parkwest Village v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 
1986). In the trial of the instant matter, this practice was 
testified to at length by retired Summit County Official Reed 
Pace and Deputy County Assessor Steven Martin. 
Plaintiffs have correctly pointed out that the practice 
of Summit County separately assessing, foreclosing and selling 
for non-payment of taxes, improvements to real property was not 
sanctioned by State Law. However, Plaintiffs then contend that 
since this practice was ultra-vires that this Court should 
conclude that any tax deed issued by Summit County for 
improvements only passes title to the underlying real property. 
Such a conclusion is prohibited by controlling constitutional 
law. 
Rather than giving the broad construction to the 
ultra-vires acts of Summit County in tax assessment, foreclosure 
and sale, this Court has uniformly held that tax assessment, 
foreclosure and sale should be strictly and narrowly construed. 
In Frederickson v. La Fleur, 632 P2d 827, 828 (Utah 1987), 
Justice Oaks wrote: 
American courts have long looked upon tax titles 
with a jaundiced eye. Like the courts of most 
other States, this Court has consistently held 
that statutes providing for the sale of tax 
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delinquent lands and the issuance of tax deeds 
pursuant to such sales are to be construed 
narrowly and in favor of the tax debtor. 
Not only are such activities to be construed narrowly 
and strictly, but other jurisdictions which, unlike Utah, have 
had the opportunity to rule, have consistently ruled that a tax 
deed or any subsequent conveyance to a tax deed can only convey 
that property which was assessed and obtained for non-payment of 
taxes. In Webermeier v. Pace, 552 P2d 1021, 1024 (Colo 1976), 
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that "the grantee of a tax 
deed secures title to no more than that owned by the Grantee's 
predecessor in title11. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals in Webermeier had the 
opportunity to rule on a similar issue to the instant matter. In 
Webermeier, A person only owned the mineral rights to coal in a 
certain parcel of real property. This person's ownership rights 
were foreclosed for non-payment of taxes and a deed was issued by 
the County after tax sale, which purported to convey all mineral 
rights. The Court held that the deed only conveyed ownership 
rights in coal since the County had only obtained the mineral 
rights to coal through the tax foreclosure and could only convey 
what it had obtained. The ownership of the other mineral interest 
holders could not be disturbed and grantees of the tax deeds had 
no claim to other mineral interests, regardless of the 
See also Mecham v. Mel-0-Tone Enterprises, Inc., 23 Utah 
2d 402, 464 P.2d 392 (1970) and Salt Lake Home Builders, Inc., v. 
Colman, 518 P.2d 165 (Utah 1974) 
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description of the tax deed. The Utah Court in Hayes v. Gibbs, 
110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 731 (1946) held that only the interest that 
is properly assessed is sold at a tax sale. The same rule 
applies to the Plaintiffs quit claim deeds (Ex. 4, 5, 6). In 
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), the Court held that a 
grantee under a quit claim deed acquires only the interest of the 
grantor. Thus, it is beyond dispute that the Plaintiffs deeds at 
most conveyed the improvements only and no real property. 
At most Plaintiffs1 tax deed and quit claim deeds 
conveyed only improvements, since that was the only ownership 
interest obtained by the County through tax foreclosure. Such 
deeds could not disturb the ownership of the underlying real 
property. Because such taxation, foreclosure and sale of 
improvements was an ultra vires act, the tax deed and quit claim 
deeds issued subsequent to the tax foreclosure of the 
improvements may well be void. In any event, such action 
absolutely cannot be broadly construed now to include the 
underlying real property. 
The public policy underlying the narrow and strict 
construction of the forfeiture of the property through the tax 
foreclosure and sale process is grounded in the Constitutional 
Prohibition against taking of property without due process of 
law. Courts around the country have uniformly held that in order 
to divest an owner of property through tax foreclosure, the owner 
must be given actual notice prior to the proceeding and the 
notice must contain a sufficient description of the property 
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being foreclosed to identify and locate it, (Sufficiency of 
91 description is discussed in Section X). 
Strict and narrow construction of all tax foreclosures 
and sale proceedings is also demanded by the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, which is made applicable to 
actions by the States by the Foruteenth Amendment and by Article 
1, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah, which both guarantee 
due process of law, before depravation of property. 
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 
Mennonite Board of Missions v, Adams, 462 U. S. 791 (1983) that 
not only must owners receive actual notice of impending tax 
foreclosure, but due process demands that all lienholders also be 
given actual notice. 
In the instant action, Plaintiffs would have this Court 
construe a 1963 tax deed issued by Summit County for a house in 
lumber yard to include the subject real property even though the 
then owner, United Park City Mines Company, paid all real 
property taxes both before and after the tax sale and obviously 
had no knowledge of any foreclosure affecting their ownership. 
The result urged by Plaintiffs would clearly violate 
the Due Process of Law. The Utah Court has also held that a 
purported sale for taxes when taxes were not delinquent was void 
See Wenatachee Reclamation District v. Mustell, 665 P. 2d 
909 (Wash. App. 1983); Wingard v. Heinkel, 424 P.2d 1010 (Wash. 
1967); Yetter v. Gallatin County, 645 P.2d 941 (Mont. 1982) 
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and conveyed no interest whatsoever to purchasers in Mecham v. 
Mel-O-Tone Enterprises, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 403, 464 P2d 392 (1970). 
POINT XIII 
ADVERSE POSSESSION DOES NOT 
OPERATE AGAINST 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE 
Even if Plaintiffs had been able to prove adverse 
possession, their window of opportunity for Adverse Possession to 
ripen closed April 2, 1969. On this date Park City, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, obtained the subject property 
by deed. The public policy prohibiting adverse possession 
against political subdivisions of the State is codified in § 
78-12-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which states: 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or 
title in or to any lands held by any town, city or 
county, or the corporate authorities thereof, 
designated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, 
alleys, parks or public squares, or for any other 
public purpose, by adverse possession thereof 
for any length of time whatsoever,... 
Public purpose is defined throughout the country very 
broadly as any activity which promotes health, safety and 
welfare. 
Pursuant to § 10-8-2, Utah Code Annotated, the City 
Council of Park City determines what activities promote the 
health, safety, and welfare, and Park City may purchase property, 
See Anderson y. Baehr, 217 SE2d 43, 47 (S. Car. 1975); 
Clifford v. City of CheyenneT487 P.2d 1325 (Wyo. 1971); Kearney 
v. City of Schenectady 325 NYS2d 278, 280 (N.Y. 1971) 
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and hold property only if the purchase and holding of such 
property will promote health, safety, and welfare. Thus, State 
law allows Park City to determine what public purposes are, and 
only buy and hold property if it promotes a public purpose. 
When the City Council of Park City obtained the subject 
property from United Park City Mines Company in 1969, such action 
is presumed to be an action promoting a public purpose. The 
holding of the subject property is also presumed to be promoting 
a public purpose. McQuillan on Municipal Corporations 3rd Ed. 
Revised 1981 § 28.11 pg. 23 states: "However, in the absence of 
a contrary provision, ordinarily it will be presumed that lands 
purchased by a municipal corporation were purchased for a purpose 
authorized by law." 
No evidence was admitted at trial which would rebut the 
presumption that the property was acquired and held for a public 
purpose. The property is now a part of Utah State Highway 224, 
and is still serving a public purpose. 
Although its inapplicability to the instant matter is 
discussed in Point VIII, the doctrine of prescriptive easement, 
like adverse possession, is unavailable against the State and its 
political subdivisions. The Utah Supreme court held that a 
private individual could not obtain a prescriptive easement in a 
public roadway in Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981). 
POINT IV 
PARK CITY IS NOT LIABLE FOR DESTRUCTION OF SHACK 
Plaintiffs claim for damages for the destruction of the 
shack is so weak that it barely merits response. It is 
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elementary tort law that a person is not liable for the actions 
of a third person actin independently. Plaintiffs, without 
authority, contend that Park City should be held liable for the 
actions of a third party in demolishing the shack. 
The evidence adduced at trial was clearly that the 
shack was demolished by a third party in connection with the 
construction of a waterline by the Deer Valley Resort. Park City 
did not participate in the demolition in any way except to issue 
a demolition permit. The building official who issued the permit 
believed that Deer Valley had the right to demolish the shack and 
a contractor for Deer Valley obtained the permit (Ex. 38) 
representing in writing that it had such right. 
It is well founded and univerally accepted law that a 
municipality has no liability if a permit is issued erroneously 
to one who is not the owner. The New York Court of Appeals held 
in Rolfe v. Village of Falconer, 467 N. E. 2d 516 (N. Y. App. 
1984) held; that the Village could not be held liable for damages 
or theft by a person who represented himself as the owner & 
obtained a building permit. 
CONCLUSION 
Like the proverbial ship in a storm which seeks any 
port, Plaintiffs have sought the subject property by any theory. 
This shotgun approach was undoubtedly precipitated by Plaintiffs1 
realization that they have no single valid claim to the subject 
property, and hope to patch together bits and pieces of various 
theories to obtain the subject property. 
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The Trial Court considered Plaintiffs' claim of title, 
their four disconnected and faulty deeds, none of which have an 
identifiable description of the property to be conveyed, and 
ruled that the State's unbroken chain of title extending back to 
Patent was superior. 
The Plaintiffs then contended that the State's title 
had been undermined by adverse possession. However, adverse 
possession requires that the adverse possessor prove payment of 
all taxes for a seven year period. Plaintiffs could only show 
payment of taxes for three years at most, while the State's 
predecessor paid taxes every year from 1931 to 1969. An adverse 
possessor must also hold the property adversely to the true 
owner. The evidence adduced at trial was that the use of the 
subject property by Plaintiffs' predecessors was permissive and 
not adverse. Finally, to bring an action for adverse possession, 
the adverse possessor must possess the property during the seven 
year period prior to bringing the action, while the Plaintiffs 
had abandoned the property over twenty years earlier. Clearly 
Plaintiffs cannot obtain the subject property by adverse 
possession. 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs claimed all of the attributes 
of ownership through prescriptive easement. This claim is a 
novel one, and would so blur the distinction between use and 
ownership as to make an easement indistinguishable from fee 
ownership. Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, there is no authority 
for this position, not only in Utah but throughout the nation. 
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Plaintiffs1 faulty adverse possession claim, cannot be 
rehabilitated by changing its title to prescriptive easement. 
The Plaintiffs then seek to shield their defective 
title with the statues of limitations afforded to purchasers of 
tax titles. This argument fails in multiple respects. First, 
the deeds Plaintiffs seek to shield are for improvements only and 
not for the subject property. Second, the Plaintiffs1 
predecessor purposely failed to pay taxes on the improvements in 
order to "boot strap11 themselves a title. Such attempts in 
creating title out of thin air were declared futile in Dillman v. 
Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980 (Utah 1982) Third, the deeds have no 
identifiable description and cannot be related to the subject 
property. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs seek repayment from Park City 
for the destruction of an abandoned shack when all of the 
evidence was that a third party demolished the shack to make was 
for a water line to its property. Once again, Plaintiffs are 
seeking to fashion a cause of action where none exists. 
It is clear that the Trial Court correctly ruled in 
dismissing every count of Plaintiffs1 complaint.The Plaintiffs 
have no rights to the subject property and the well-thought and 
reasoned ruling of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this |* day of ugCgfribg^ > 1987. 
Assistant uity Attorney 
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A D D E N D U M 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA MARCHANT, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PARK CITY, a Municipal 
corporation, JACK COPPEDGE, 
and the STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 7174 
The above case was tried, commencing May 6, 1987. The 
Court received evidence by way of testimony, exhibit, and stipula-
tion, and after hearing final arguments of counsel, took the 
matter under advisement. The Court has now reviewed the evidence 
and law in this matter, and renders its Memorandum Decision 
as follows: 
1. The defendants' title to the underlying property in 
question, even with the claimed Michigan Trust Company gap, 
is superior to the title line claimed by the plaintiffs. The 
defendants1 title is traceable to the patent of the United States 
Government. Plaintiffs1 title is insufficient in description 
and continuity. The plaintiff does not have title to the underlying 
property. Plaintiffs' title, if any, was to the house or improve-
ments on the underlying property. 
MARCHANT V. PARK CITY PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
2. The underlying property in question was owned by the 
mining company, who allowed certain miners to build houses on 
the said property. Summit County assessed taxes against the 
underlying property separately from against the improvements 
thereon. If the owner of the improvements (house) failed to 
pay taxes, legal process eventually led to a tax sale only as 
to that improvement. Anyone who purchased at the tax sale acquired 
only that property that had been so assessed and levied against. 
3. The various tax deeds did not give plaintiffs • predecessors 
more than they already had. 
4. Plaintiffs • predecessors never paid taxes on the underlying 
property, but only on that which had been assessed against them, 
the improvements. 
5. The defendants' predecessors paid all assessed taxes 
on the underlying property. 
6. The plaintiffs1 predecessors did not obtain the underlying 
property by adverse possession, since they never paid taxes 
on the same, and did not hold the same adversely against the 
true owner who did pay taxes on the said property. 
7. The plaintiffs did not obtain the underlying property 
by adverse possession, since such cannot be had against a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah. In any case, they did not 
have possession for more than seven years before filing of the 
Complaint, they did not pay all assessed taxes on the property 
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in question, and their claims are barred by the statute of limita-
tions. 
8. For more than seven years prior to the filing of the 
Complaint, the property in question was not possessed by plaintiffs, 
rather it was abandoned. It was empty and open. It was in 
a state of deterioration. Those rare visits claimed by defendant 
did not constitute possession. 
9. The tax deeds conveyed only the house and not the 
underlying property. 
10. Prescriptive easement is not applicable, inasmuch 
as it applies only to use, and not to title claims to the fee 
simple. 
11. The house which had been owned by plaintiffs1 predecessors 
was removed or demolished by a third party, not a party to this 
legal action. Because the house was abandoned, open, and considered 
a nuisance, Park City demanded of owners to abate the same. 
On application for permit, Park City granted such permit allowing 
demolition of the house. Park City did not participate in de-
struction of the house, and cannot be liable thereof. 
12. The granting of a demolition permit by Park City to 
a contractor, based on proper application, does not impose liability 
on Park City if the permit was wrongfully obtained or the work 
therein unlawfully performed. 
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13. Plaintiffs make no claim against the State of Utah 
for removal or destruction of the house. 
14. Even if plaintiffs had established liability on a 
party hereto for destruction of the house in question, the evidence 
of such damage is insufficient for an award to be made. There 
was no evidence presented as to the value of this old building, 
and no finding could be made without gross speculation in regards 
thereto. 
15. Furthermore, the plaintiffs' claims are barred by 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1, et seq. 
No notices of claim were filed within one year after the claim 
arose as required by that Act. The plaintiffs were aware of 
the destroyed building prior to Labor Day 1981. No notice of 
claim was ever filed against the State of Utah. Notice of claim 
was filed against Park City on September 20, 1982, more than 
one year after the plaintiffs learned of the destruction of 
the building. The very latest the claim could arise was at 
that time. 
16. Title to the land in question is quieted in the defen-
dants (State of Utah). Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages 
against these defendants. 
Attorney for the defendant Park City will prepare the appro-
priate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, and 
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submit the same to plaintiffs' attorney for approval as to form 
before submitting them to the Court for final signature. 
Dated this <£cK day of May, 1987. 
/Si Leonard- l4.£usson 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this day of May, 1987: 
Robert Felton 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
5 Triad Center, Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
J. Craig Smith 
James W. Carter 
Attorneys for Defendant Park City 
445 Marsac Avenue 
P.O. Box 1480 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Allen Backman 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84114 
J. CRAIG SMITH, #4143 
JAMES W. CARTER, #0586 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
445 Marsac Avenue 
P.O. Box 1480 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (801)649-9321 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA MARCHANT, et al. i 
Plaintiffs, ; 
v. ] 
PARK CITY, a municipal ; 
corporation, JACK ] 
COPPEDGE, and the STATE ] 
OF UTAH, ] 
Defendants. ] 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 7174 
I Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
This matter came regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987 
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding, 
the Trial concluded on May 7, 1987, after all parties had 
fully presented all evidence and argued their respective 
positions. The parties appeared through, and were 
represented by, their respective counsel, J. Craig Smith, 
Esq., Assistant City Attorney, and James W. Carter, Esq., 
City Attorney, for Defendant Park City Municipal 
Corporation, Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General 
for Defendant State of Utah, and Robert Felton, Esq., for 
Plaintiffs, Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod, 
Mona Liechty and Merle R. Anderson. 
Evidence was received in the form of testimony, exhibit 
and stipulation, oral argument on the facts and law were 
made by respective counsel and legal memoranda were 
submitted. 
Having given full consideration to the evidence 
admitted, the legal memoranda submitted, and the oral 
argument made, the Court having entered a Memorandum 
Decision and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law does hereby Order, Adjudge and Decree as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause thereof, is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Fee ownership of the real property in question, 
which is particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point which is North 407.38 feet West 
41.39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast 
one-quarter of the Northeast one-quarter Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian thence North 36°40f9ff West 71.46 feet; thence 
North 57°29,15" East 77.50 feet; thence South 18°58l45,f 
East 70.93 feet; thence South 55°6f25ff West 55.77 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
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is quieted in the State of Utah free of any interest, lien, 
easement, or encumbrance of Plaintiffs. 
3. Each party is to bear its own attorney's fees and 
costs of court. 
4. This is a final and appealable judgment. 
v1^ 
DATED t h i s _£ day of 4wt^T 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
y ttmtv h tttlk 
Leonard H. Russon 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
& 
1 C r a i ^ S m i « - / E s q . 
ttorntfy^or Defendant 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
Aran Bachman, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
Stafc^ o / Uta^ 
mm/\Felton* ts<\. 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s 
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J. CRAIG SMITH, #4143 
JAMES W. CARTER, #0586 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
445 Marsac Avenue 
P.O. Box 1480 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (801)649-9321 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA MARCHANT, et al. ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
v. ] 
PARK CITY, a municipal ] 
corporation, JACK ] 
COPPEDGE, and the STATE ] 
OF UTAH, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> Civil No. 7174 
> Honorable Leonard H. Russon 
This matter came on regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987 
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, District 
Judge presiding. The parties appeared through and were 
represented by their respective counsel, J. Craig Smith, 
Esq., Assistant City Attorney and James W. Carter, Esq., 
City Attorney for Defendant Park City Municipal Corporation, 
Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General for Defendant 
State of Utah and Robert Felton, Esq., for the Plaintiffs, 
Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod, Mona Liechty 
and Merle R. Anderson. 
At the Trial the Court received evidence by way of 
testimony, exhibit and stipulation and heard argument by 
counsel representing the respective parties. 
Having given full consideration to all of the testimony 
heard and evidence admitted and having reviewed the legal 
memoranda and heard the oral argument, and now being 
appraised as to all and singularly the law and the facts of 
the matter, the Court herewith makes and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The real property in question which was the 
subject of this action is described as follows: 
Beginning at a point which is North 407.38 feet West 
41 • 39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast 
one-quarter of the Northeast one-quarter Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian thence North 36°40f9,f West 71.46 feet; thence 
North 57°29,15" East 77.50 feet; thence South 18°58'45,f 
East 70.93 feet; thence South 55°6f25fl West 55.77 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
2. The chain of title through which Defendant State 
of Utah claims title to the real property in question is 
traceable to the patent derived from the United States 
Government. 
3. The real property in question was previously owned 
by Silver King Coalition Mines Company. It was a common 
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practice for Silver King Coalition Mines Company to allow 
miners to construct houses on real property the Company 
owned. 
4. Plaintiffs1 predecessors in interest worked for 
Silver King Coalition Mines Company and were permitted to 
construct a house on the real property in question. 
5. The underlying real property in question was 
assessed by Summit County separately from the house located 
thereon claimed by Plaintiffs. 
6. Defendant's predecessors in interest paid all real 
property taxes assessed against the underlying real property 
in question. 
7. Neither Plaintiffs nor their predecessors in 
interest paid any taxes on the underlying real property in 
question. 
8. Plaintiffs did not have possession of the real 
property in question for a period in excess of seven years 
prior to filing their complaint; it was abandoned, empty and 
open and in a state of deterioration and was rarely visited 
by Plaintiffs. 
9. The chain of title through which Plaintiffs claim 
title to the real property in question is discontinuous. 
10. The tax deeds through which Plaintiffs claim title 
were given by Summit County pursuant to unpaid tax 
delinquencies on the improvements located on the underlying 
real property in question. 
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11. The house which had been owned by Plaintiffs1 
predecessors was removed or demolished by a third party, not 
a party to this action. 
12. Because of the abandoned and deteriorated nature 
of the house on the property Park City granted a demolition 
permit for the demolition of the house, on proper 
application, to a third party claiming ownership of the 
house. 
13. There was no evidence presented as to the value of 
the house and no finding as to the value can be made without 
gross speculation. 
14. Plaintiffs were aware of the destruction of the 
house prior to September 7, 1981. 
15. No notice of claim was ever filed by the 
Plaintiffs against Defendant State of Utah. 
16. Notice of claim was filed against Defendant Park 
City on September 20, 1982, more than one year after the 
Plaintiffs learned of the destruction of the house. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The chain of title through which the Defendant 
State of Utah claims title is superior to the chain of title 
through which Plaintiffs claim title. 
2. Plaintiffs1 claim to title by deed to the 
underlying real property in question, fails due to 
insufficient descriptions in the claimed deeds and a lack 
-*-
of continuity of Plaintiffs1 claimed chain of title. 
Plaintiffs1 title, if any, was to the house or improvements 
located upon the real property in question. 
3. The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title 
to the real property conveyed improvements only and had no 
effect on title to the underlying real property in question. 
4. The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title 
to the underlying real property in question add nothing to 
the title of the Plaintiffs'. 
5. Adverse possession cannot be had against Defendant 
Park City, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, or 
against Defendant State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-13, 1953 as amended. 
6. Plaintiffs' claim of title to the real property in 
question by adverse possession and claim of easement by 
prescription are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-5, 1953 
as amended. 
7. Plaintiffs' claim against the State of Utah is 
barred by Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1, 
et. seq. 
8. Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Park City 
Municipal Corporation are barred by Plaintiffs' failure to 
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Annotated § 63-30-1, et. seq. 
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9. Plaintiffs1 claim of adverse possession of the 
real property in question fails, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-12-12, 1953 as amended, for failing to show 
payment of all taxes which have been levied and assessed 
upon the real property in question according to law. 
10. Plaintiffs' claims of adverse possession of the 
real property in question and of prescriptive easement fail 
since possession by Plaintiffs1 predecessors in interest was 
not adverse to the interests of Defendants1 predecessors in 
interest. 
11. Plaintiffs' claim of prescriptive easement to the 
entire area of the real property in question fails as 
inapplicable to the facts of the case and concerns only use 
rather than possession of or title to real property. 
12. Defendant Park City is not liable to Plaintiffs 
for issuing a demolition permit, based on proper 
application, notwithstanding whether the permit was 
wrongfully obtained or the demolition work unlawfully 
performed. 
13. Plaintiffs have stated no claim against the State 
of Utah for the destruction of the house. 
14. Plaintiffs' complaint, and each cause thereof, 
should be dismissed with prejudice and title to the real 
property in question should be quieted in the State of Utah 
free and clear of any interest, lien, easement, or 
encumbrance by Plaintiffs. 
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15. Plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages against 
Defendants. 
Wherefore, let judgment be entered in favor of the 
Defendants and against the Plaintiffs in accordance with 
these findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Dated this (pik day of June, 1987 
By the Court 
s/fy^er 
Leonard H. Russon 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Cr££fe Sfhith, Esq. 
ttomey for Defendant 
Park City Municipal Corporation 
liU^ LUJLAA^ 
i Bachman, Esq. Alan 
Attorryav/for J)efendant^ 
Statjg/oxUtc 
>ert Fel ton, 




I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, 
postage prepaid, to the following individual on the th 
day of June, 1987: 
Alan Bachman, Esq. 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Robert M. Felton, Esq. 
5 Triad Center, Suite 585 




CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 




All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ART. I, § 7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
CHAPTER 30 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for 
filing notice. 
A claim against the state or its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim 
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Subsec-
tion 63-30-11(4). 
PART III. 
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance of affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
CHAPTER 12 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
78-12-5. Seizure or possession within seven years neces-
sary. 
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall 
be maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or 
predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in question within seven 
years before the commencement of the action. 
78-12-7. Adverse possession — Possession presumed in 
owner. 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, 
the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have 
been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of 
the property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in 
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been 
held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action. 
78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under writ-
ten instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claim-
ing a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases: 
(1) where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(2) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
(3) where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, 
or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for 
the ordinary use of the occupant. 
(4) where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the 
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not 
inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county 
is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part 
improved and cultivated. 
78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written instrument 
or judgment. 
Where it appears that there has been an actual continued occupation of land 
under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a 
written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually occupied, and no 
other, is deemed to have been held adversely. 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
7g.l2-ll- What constitutes adverse possession not under 
written instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming 
tie not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is 
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only: 
(1) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
(2) where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(3) where labor or money has been expended upon dams, canals, em-
bankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such 
lands amounting to the sum of $5 per acre. 
78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways. 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands 
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, desig-
nated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, 
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of 
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or 
county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, 
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and 
that for more than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, 
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous 
and adverse possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may 
be acquired. 
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid. 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the 
provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land 
has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and 
that the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
